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On perhaps no other legal issue have courts so widely differed, or
so often changed their views, as that of the legal responsibility of in-
toxicated offenders.' The question contrasts the individual's right to
avoid punishment for the unintended consequences of his acts with
what then-New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice David Souter de-
scribed as the individual's "responsibility... to stay sober if his intoxi-
cation will jeopardize the lives and safety of others."2 The issue
presents the choice of whether the magnitude of an offense should be
measured from the objective perspective of the community or the sub-
jective perspective of the offender.3
Prompted by myriad changes in social, political, medical and
legal philosophies, nineteenth and early twentieth century courts
greatly expanded the exculpatory effect of intoxication. Beginning in
the 1980s and 1990s, however, the pendulum began to swing back to-
ward a policy of accountability for acts committed while intoxicated.
Throughout this process, the issue has been highlighted by the com-
peting positions of courts and legislatures. For example, in 1994 both
the California and Canada Supreme Courts issued decisions which
protected or expanded a defendant's right to introduce evidence of
his intoxication.4 Both decisions sparked public outrage,5 and were in
effect reversed by new statutes in 1995.6
1 Evers v. State, 20 S.W. 744, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1892).
2 State v. Dufield, 549 A.2d 1205, 1208 (N.H. 1988).
3 Note, Constructive Murder-Drunkenness in Relation to Mens Rea, 34 HARv. L R.. 78,
80-81 (1920) [hereinafter Constructive Murder].
4 People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 273 (Cal. 1994); Daviault v. The Queen [1994] 3
S.C.R. 63, 65.
5 See Mitchell Keiter, Excuses for Intoxicated Killers, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1995, at A17;
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Women in Canada Upset by Court Rulings on Drunkenness, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1994, at A7.
6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Act ofJuly 13, 1995, ch. 32, 1995
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. Egel-
hoff' will likely have a profound effect on the debate surrounding the
intoxication defense. The Court upheld a Montana statute which
holds intoxicated8 offenders fully responsible for the consequences of
acts they commit while intoxicated. While the plurality, concurring,
and various dissenting opinions reflected differing perspectives, none
found it would be unconstitutional for a state to equate a severe state
of intoxication with the requisite mens rea for any crime. The Court's
approval will likely influence other states to adopt a full responsibility
policy.9
Many serious crimes are committed by an individual under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs;10 in 1989, more homicides were
committed by an intoxicated assailant than with a firearm." Abolition
of the intoxication defense may further efforts to stop not only drug
abuse but all serious crimes.
Part II of this article reviews the history of the intoxication de-
fense in America, describing the social, cultural and scientific trends
which shaped the course of the doctrine. Part Ill surveys the laws of
the partial responsibility states, and Part IV distinguishes the intoxica-
S.C. 32.
7 116 S. Ct. 2018 (1996).
8 Unless otherwise indicated, the term "intoxication" in this article refers to "volun-
tary" or "self-induced" intoxication. The Model Penal Code defines this to mean "intoxica-
tion caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces
them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to
a charge of crime." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(b) (1962). The Montana statute exempts a
defendant from responsibility where he affirmatively shows he did not know the substance
was an intoxicant. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
9 Ten states have such "full responsibility" laws. See infra Appendix. These states bar
intoxication from serving as a legal defense but not as a factual one. Defendants may
introduce intoxication evidence to demonstrate they did not commit the charged offense,
but not to show they did not intend it.
Two states, Pennsylvania and Virginia, admit evidence of intoxication to evaluate a
murderer's mental state and determine the degree of murder, but exclude it in every other
prosecution. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (1983); Chittum v. Commonwealth, 174
S.E.2d 779, 783 (Va. 1970). Indiana currently stands alone among the states in admitting
intoxication evidence as a complete defense to any crime. See Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d
1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984). Every other state follows a partial responsibility policy which per-
mits intoxication as a defense to some crimes but not to others. See infra Appendix. The
offenses for which intoxication is not a defense are ussually lesser counterparts to offenses
for which intoxication is a defense. People v. Gutierrez, 225 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887 (Ct. App.
1986); GEORGE FU-rCHER, RErHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 848-49 (1978).
10 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON IN-
MATEs, 1991, at 26 (1993) [hereinafter SURVEY].
11 BUREAU oFJusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUS-
TICE STATISTICS 1992, 381 tbl. 3.133, 603 tbl. 6.54 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOoK-1992].
MITC!ELL KEITER
tion defense from other criminal defenses. Part V examines the Mon-
tana statute reviewed in Montana v. Egelhoff. Part VI offers a policy
rationale for a full responsibility doctrine. Part VII concludes by con-
tending the ultimate policy decision to determine the proper extent
of responsibility for intoxicated offenders is one which properly rests
not with courts but with the people and their elected representatives.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE
A student could learn much about modem history from studying
the history of the criminal law's position toward intoxicated offenders.
The contraction and expansion of intoxicated offenders' criminal re-
sponsibility has not occurred in a vacuum; it has reflected the major
cultural trends and values of the past two centuries. "The doctrines of
actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have his-
torically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical and medical views of the nature of
man."12 The history of this issue illuminates all of these themes as well
as the changing relationship between the individual and society.
The common law punished sober and intoxicated offenders
equally. According to Reniger v. Fogossa13 an English case from the
year 1551:
[I]f a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he
shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he
was drunk he had no understanding nor memory, but inasmuch as that
ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have
avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby.14
Because the offender created his disability, it could not serve to
exculpate.
This analysis flowed from the law's former "harm-oriented"
framework, which considered harm a prima facie case of guilt' 5 A
valid defense (which intoxication was not) could negate the prima fa-
cie case. 16 In contrast, the modem "act-oriented" framework first con-
siders the mental state of the defendant.' 7 Where there is no mens
rea, there is no need to consider the extent of the harm caused. The
absence of mens rea is thus not an affirmative defense but the absence
12 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
13 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ex. Ch. 1551).
14 Id. at 31, quoted in People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 292 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk J.,
concurring).
15 See FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 238.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 238-39.
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of an essential element of the crime charged.' 8
This analytical shift has affected the law's posture toward crimes
committed under severe intoxication. 19 One who cannot form a crim-
inal intent due to intoxication has not violated the mental element of
the offense. In Terry v. State,20 the Indiana Supreme Court stated,
"The murder statute clearly requires an intentional act on the part of
the perpetrator .... In order to form intent... the perpetrator must
be acting consciously and competently. Any situation which renders
the perpetrator incapable of forming intent frees him from the re-
sponsibility of his acts."21 Thus, in the modem framework, where
there is no mental element, there also is no punishable wrong, the
harm notwithstanding. 22
The evolution of the law from Reniger v. Fogossa to Terry v. State 3
resulted not only from a new procedural framework but also from
changing substantive ideals ofjustice. In most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the classical school of criminology prevailed. The classical model
was based on the premise of a social contract through which people
surrendered liberties to the state in exchange for protection from
criminals and wrongdoers.2 4 Influenced by the Enlightenment, the
18 See i& at 238.
19 Evidence of slight intoxication does not exculpate as a matter of law;, there must be
evidence that the intoxication interfered with the actor's forming the requisite intent. See,
e.g., CAL. PEA. CODE § 22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
The circumstances in which intoxication evidence is admissible reflect changing atti-
tudes about intoxication. Initially, a defendant's responsibility for his conduct was an ir-
rebuttable presumption. See, for example, Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870), in which
the court stated:
He must be held to have purposely blinded his moral perceptions, and set his will free
from the control of reason-to have suppressed the guards and invited the mutiny;,
and should therefore be held responsible as well for the vicious excesses of the will,
thus set free, as for the acts done by its prompting.
Id at 419.
The twentieth century approach requires the prosecution show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the intoxication was not so severe "as to completely paralyze the will of the
defendant and to take from him the power to withstand evil impulses." State v.
McGehearty, 394 A.2d 1348, 1351 n.5 (R.I. 1978). The law now sees becoming intoxicated
as a passive act, of which the inebriate is the victim.
20 465 N.E.2d 1085 (Ind. 1984).
21 Id. at 1087-88 (quoting Sills v. State, 463 N.E.2d 228, 240-41 (Ind. 1984) (Givan, J.,
concurring)).
22 Most states view the act of becoming stuporous as adequate to constitute some level
of mens rea. SeeArnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness and Harm: Balancing The Factors
On Which Our CfiminalLawlsPrediated, 66 N.C. L Rev. 283, 297 n.100 (1988).' These states
permit intoxication to serve as a defense to some crimes, which are usually the most seri-
ous. See infra Part M.
23 The Canada Supreme Court followed the logic of Teny v. State in Daviault in allowing
intoxication to serve as a complete defense to any charge. See Daviault v. The Queen
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63, 64.
24 C. RAYJEFFERY, CRMInOLOcY, AN INTERDisCIPuNARY APPROACH 65 (1990).
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classical school assumed that people were rational agents motivated by
self-interest. "The cardinal principal of criminal jurisprudence is that
a crime is the act of a voluntary and responsible agent who chooses
between the lawful and unlawful. From this standpoint, guilt, like sin,
is personal, because each man is the captain of his own conduct."25
Punishing criminals served the communal purpose of sanctioning de-
viant behavior and thereby deterring future recurrences.
By the late nineteenth century, the scientific school had begun to
displace its classical forerunner.2 6 The scientific school attributed
criminal behavior to biological and environmental determinism, be-
lieving criminals to be neither selfish nor sinful, merely sick. The sci-
entific school promoted the notion that the questions of crime in
general and intoxication in particular were not moral in nature but
medical.27
In 1956, the American Medical Association first recognized alco-
holism as a "disease." This declaration advanced the theory that even
self-induced intoxication could be classified as "involuntary," compa-
rable to mental illness.28 "If alcoholism, however, is recognized as a
'sickness,' a concomitant recognition must be that, similar to an in-
sane person, the alcoholic does not 'sin' when he takes a drink....-"29
Two federal circuit courts agreed, comparing punishing an alcoholic's
involuntary drinking and subsequent public appearance with punish-
ing an insane person, an infant or a leper.30
25 Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Lemuel Shaw, quoted in LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 209-10 (1985). Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that be-
cause of the law's assumption "that every man is able as every other to behave as they
command," legal standards thus "take no account of incapacities unless the weakness is so
marked as to fall into well-known exceptions such as infancy or madness." Id. at 210. See
Act of Apr. 16, 1850, ch.99, § 3, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229 (codified in CAL- PENAL CODE § 21
(Deering 1996)).
26 RuTH MASTERS & Cr ROBERSON, INSIDE CRIMINOLOGY 103 (1990).
27 Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
80J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893 n.62 (1990).
It was popular to speak of crime in medical terms-crime was no more or less than a
treatable disease, as the 1931 Wickersham Commission explained: "Physicians, upon
discovering disease, cannot name the day upon which the patient will be healed. No
more can judges intelligently set the day of release from prison at the time of trial."
Id. See also Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1852-54 (1984).
28 The law had traditionally distinguished between the "voluntary madness" of intoxica-
tion and mental illness for which the subject was not responsible. See Hendershott v. Peo-
ple, 653 P.2d 385, 396 (Colo. 1982); United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 658
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868). Three years after the AMA's pronouncement, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court conflated the defenses of intoxication and mental illness in a case
which involved both. See People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492, 501-03 (Cal. 1959).
29 Daniel R. Coburn, Note, Driver to Easter to Powell: Recognition of the Defense of Involun-
tary Intoxication, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 103, 116 (1967).
30 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (insane person and
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The United States Supreme Court arrested this trend in Powell v.
Texas,31 finding that the Eighth Amendment did not prevent states
from criminalizing public intoxication. 2 The Powell dissent recog-
nized the "uncontrollable compulsion to drink,"33 but stressed that
such a compulsion was a proper defense only to charges of public
intoxication, and not to more serious charges such as driving while
intoxicated, assault, theft or robbery.34 Justice Marshall found this dis-
tinction artificial and illogical.3 5 One advocate of the defense was
more candid about its scope:
Since it is now judicially as well as medically and legislatively recog-
nized that alcoholism is a "disease" which compels its victims to drink
involuntarily, there is no logical reason why an alcoholic should be held
responsible for any conduct performed while involuntarily intoxicated
.... the traditional punishment of an alcoholic for conduct performed
while involuntarily intoxicated as a result of alcoholism "is as archaic as
the medieval outlook that the community once had with respect to in-
sanity, tuberculosis and leprosy."3 6
Commentators who believed "criminal" behavior was not freely cho-
sen but biologically determined naturally had a different perspective
on punishment than that advanced by the classical school.
The scientific school favored rehabilitation over deterrence as
the function of criminal law. Since the goal was not for the law to
deter rational actors but for medicine to heal dysfunctional ones, pun-
ishment was directed not to the crime but to the criminal.3 7
In accordance with this sentencing trend, the law began to focus
more on subjective intents rather than objective harms. The law had
infant); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 1966) (leper).
31 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
32 1&d at 532, 535-37. Significantly, a majority of the justices accepted as fact the conten-
tion that an alcoholic's intoxication was involuntary in a legal sense. Id. at 549 (White, J.,
concurring); id at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart
joined the dissent). Justice White's swing opinion, which accepted the dissent's position
that an alcoholic was "compelled to drink," found no comparable compulsion for the alco-
holic to appear in public. Id. at 549-50 (White, J., concurring). If the statute had pro-
scribed intoxication anywhere, Powell likely would have prevailed.
33 Id. at 557 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 534 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36 Coburn, supra note 29, at 122-23, 125 (qoutingJohns, A Practical Approach, in REPORT
OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROCKY MouNTAn CONFERENCE OF MUNICIPAL JUDGES 52 (Oct.
1959)).
37 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978) (citation omitted); Nagel, supra
note 27, at 893. See also I.AWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 216-17 (1993), citing a letter from Cesare Lombroso to John W. Wigmore of the
National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology (1899) which "emphasize[d] the
importance of apportioning penalties, not according to the offense but according to the
offender." See also Paul Johnson, God and the Americans, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1995, at 40-41.
1997]
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always recognized the potential injustice to intoxicated offenders who
received full punishment, but had formerly determined criminality
from the community's perspective.
In the forum of conscience there is no doubt considerable differ-
ence between a murder deliberately planned and executed by a person
of unclouded intellect, and the reckless taking of life by one infuriated
by intoxication; but human laws are based upon considerations of policy,
and look rather to the maintenance of personal security and social or-
der, than to an accurate discrimination as to the moral qualities of indi-
vidual conduct.3 8
The law thus promoted the public interest by imposing a duty to avoid
a potentially dangerous state of stupefaction on those who consumed
intoxicants. "It is a duty which every one owes to his fellow-men and
to society, to say nothing of more solemn obligations, to preserve, so
far as it lies in his own power, the inestimable gift of reason."3 9 Con-
sistent with social contract theory, the individual forfeited his "right"
to be exonerated for the unintended consequences of his acts for the
greater good of communal safety.
The subjective focus undertaken in Teny v. State shifted this bur-
den of injustice. Rather than impose any injustice on the offender by
punishing his unintentional conduct, Terry imposed an injustice on
the victim and the community, which had to endure harm without
incapacitating the offender and deterring future offenses.40
The expansion of the intoxication defense also reallocated the
burden of avoiding the infliction of harm. "Society has a duty to the
individual subject to its control to protect him 'against the misuse of
the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited,
authorizing sentences reasonably related to the conduct and charac-
ter of the convicted person, and prescribing fair and reasonable post-
conviction procedures.'" 41 The duty no longer lay with the individual
inebriate, but with the justice system prosecuting him.
This shift mirrored the larger cultural trend in which individual
rights replaced individual responsibilities. 42 Citizens became more in-
terested in what society owed them than the reverse. The societal
transformation produced by urbanization, technology and immigra-
tion shaped a new relationship between the individual and the com-
munity. The development of modem cities, with their anonymity,
38 People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (1858).
39 Id.
40 This injustice occurs to a lesser extent in partial responsibility states.
41 Case Comment, CriminalLaw: Chronic Alcoholism as aDefense to Crime, 61 MmN. L. REv.
901, 917 (1977) (quoting MiN,. STAT. § 609.01(2) (1976)).
42 See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHi. L.
REv. 131, 148 (1995).
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weakened traditional family, neighborhood and religious bonds, as
did the successive developments of railroads, telephones, auto-
mobiles, radio, movies, jet airplanes and television. 43 Migration be-
tween states and countries further loosened the individual's
connection to any community. 44 Individuals increasingly came to see
their interests through their own perspectives, rather than that of a
community to which their grandparents had owed loyalty and duty.
The law responded by reallocating rights enjoyed by the community
to the individual.
The new priority on individual autonomy over communal welfare
had a special effect on cultural attitudes regarding intoxication. The
culture had long regarded alcohol as a social evil.45 Primarily through
schools and religious institutions, nineteenth-century America in-
vested heavily in programs to promote impulse control.46 But the new
forces which eroded community and religious norms fostered individ-
ual autonomy about the decision whether and how much to drink.
"What 'respectable society' labeled vice, a substantial minority (or ma-
jority?) labeled pleasure... ."47 Like other behaviors that were once
believed to require social intervention, drinking was no longer consid-
ered to be a public wrong but a private choice.48
As society came to see intoxication as involuntary (for "al-
coholics") or respectable (for everyone else), the law could no longer
infer culpability per se from the act of becoming intoxicated. The law
4 3 JAMEs Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTREIN, CRIME AND HuMAN NATURE 451 (1985).
These technological developments may also have contributed to Americans' shrinking
time-horizons, which have prompted many people to favor their immediate interests over
their long-term ones. Id. at 417-22. Such a value preference may have influenced the law
to protect the individual's immediate interest in unrestrained drinking over the more in-
tangible goal of communal safety.
44 FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 193.
45 See, e.g., Proverbs 20:1; Atkins v. State, 105 S.W. 353, 361 (Tenn. 1907) ("[T]his de-
grading and disgraceful, yet too common, vice, [should be] hunted from society as the
bane of social and domestic happiness.").
46 WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 434.
47 FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 341. The nascent twentieth century culture promoted
self-fulfillment and self-gratification over self-discipline. Schneider, supra note 27, at 1851.
In the nineteenth century scarcely anyone dissented from the view that character for-
mation required teaching people to restrain self-indulgent impulses. By the 1920s,
popular versions of the theories of Sigmund Freud had led many to believe that adult
problems arose because children and adolescents had been taught to repress their
instincts.
WILSON & HERRNmSTFN, supra note 43, at 435 (emphasis in original). See also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 37, at 346 ("[In] the age of individuality.. [t]he finger of doom [was] now
pointed at repremion....").
48 WILSON & HERRNMSrFIr, supra note 43, at 436. The new thinking minimized the socie-
tal danger associated with intoxication. Jerome Hall characterized the harm inflicted by a
grossly intoxicated person as "bare chance result[ing] in an unsought harm." Jerome Hall,
Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1072 (1944).
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redirected blame away from the offender toward the intoxicant it-
self.49 "So long as this release [of inhibitions] is traced to a drug
rather than a quality inherent in the individual, it is more difficult to
blame the individual for the ensuing behavior."50 In a triumph for
the scientific school, the law relaxed rules of personal responsibility
while tightening restrictions against the use of illicit drugs.51 These
trends combined to produce the bizarre result whereby states such as
California punished possession of certain substances more severely
than killing under their influence. 52
States began to expand the legal responsibility of intoxicated of-
fenders in the late twentieth century. As with the earlier trend which
reduced the liability of intoxicated offenders, both attitudes about
crime in general and intoxication in particular have shaped the law's
new direction.
As the crime rate rose in the 1960s and 1970s,5 3 the imperative of
49 John Kaplan, Alcohol, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice, in ALCOHOLISM AND RE-
LATED PROBLEMS: ISSUES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 78, 85 (Louis Jolyon West ed., 1984).
50 Id. The growing class of alcohol consumers became a growing class ofjurors reluc-
tant to cast the first stone at an accused inebriate. Although people acknowledged the
nominal blameworthiness of intoxication, "people were also ready ... to believe that the
liquor [and] drugs... robbed you of your mind, your freedom, your very self." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 37, at 148.
51 Chester N. Mitchell, Intoxication, Criminality and Responsibility, 13 INr'L.J.L & PSYCHI-
ATRY 1, 4 (1990). See also Mimi Ajzenstadt and Brian E. Burtch, Medicalization and Regulation
of Alcohol and Alcoholism: The Professions and Disciplinary Measures, 13 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY
127, 135 (1990) for an explanation of the "scientific" roots of this redirection:
Drawing scientific support from psychology, biology and medicine, new modes of
knowledge in the 19th century-and in particular "the sciences of criminology"-
challenged the assumptions which saw individuals as responsible for their own behav-
ior. The sources of criminal activity were now traced to physical and biological factors,
or social conditions beyond the control of each individual. This epistemological approach
to "social problems" had the effect of undermining the responsibility of individuals, while simulta-
neously allowing the State to assume even greater powers in "correcting" problems now deemed
beyond the individual's power to alter.
(emphasis added).
52 Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFrIY CODE § 11378.5 (West 1991) (possession for sale of
designated substance is punishable by imprisonment for three, four or five years),
§ 11379(b) (transportation for sale of specified controlled substances is punishable by im-
prisonment for three, six or nine years) and § 11379.6 (a) (manufacturing of specified con-
trolled substances is punishable by imprisonment for three, five or seven years) with People
v. Ray, 533 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal. 1975) ("[Ifan accused is unable to harbor malice and an
intent to kill because of voluntary intoxication . . .he cannot be guilty of an unlawful
homicide greater than involuntary manslaughter....") and CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(b)
(West 1988) ("Involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three, or four years.").
53 From 1960 to 1980, for instance, the national homicide rate increased from 4.5 to 11
per 100,000 people. MASTERS & ROBERSON, supra note 26, at 42. In that period, per capita
alcohol consumption increased 30%. LouisJolyon West, Alcoholism and Related Problems: An
Overview, in ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS: ISSUES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 1, 3
(LouisJolyon West ed., 1984).
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public order replaced procedural fairness for defendants as a societal
priority.54 A Federal Sentencing Guidelines Committee Report em-
phasized the need for courts to "consider justice for the public as well
asjustice for the offender."55 The law thus began to return to a more
objective evaluation of crime, punishing offenses rather than offend-
ers. Empirical evidence has discredited goals and means which pro-
ceeded from an individualist perspective such as rehabilitation,
sentencing discretion and indeterminate sentencing. 56 Legislatures
have since been more inclined to see inebriated killers as killers rather
than as inebriates.
Society's perception of intoxication has also changed over the
past two decades. Citing the work of Herbert Fingarette, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that alcoholics are not power-
less in regulating their consumption. 57 At the same time, the culture
has come to recognize the catastrophic consequences of unrestricted
drug and alcohol consumption. A prominent campaign against driv-
ing while intoxicated informed the public that fatalities were a natural
consequence of extreme intoxication, not the result of "bare
chance."58 The South Carolina Supreme Court thus reaffirmed the
traditional opinion of intoxication.
The effect of drunkenness on the mind and on men's actions ... is
a fact known to everyone, and it is as much the duty of men to abstain
from placing themselves in a condition from which such danger to
others is to be apprehended as it is to abstain from firing into a crowd,
or doing any other act likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal
consequences.59
Intoxication has lost much of its exculpatory effect as society has come
to recognize it as both voluntary and dangerous.
54 FRI.DmAN, supra note 37, at 305-06.
55 Nagel, supra note 27, at 915.
56 Id. at 895-97.
57 Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550-51, 564 (1988) (citing Herbert Fingarette, The
Perils of Powell: In search of a Factual Foundation for the Disease Concept of Alcoholim, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 793, 802-08 (1970)). See also HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAvy DRINKING: THE MYTH OF
ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE 34-37 (1988); HERBERT FINGARETIE & ANN FINGARETrE HASSE,
MENrAL DISABILrIIES AND CRIMINAL REsPONSIB nY 101-02 (1979); Chester N. Mitchell, The
Intoxicated Offender-Refuting the Legal and Medical Myths, 11 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 77, 96-
97 (1988). Alcoholics Anonymous posits the subject's personal responsibility as central to
her success. Warren Lehman, Alow Freedom and Moral Responsibility, 13 INT'LJ.L. & Psa-
cHiATRY 103, 111 (1990); see also Rosemary L. McGinn, For Me, Alcohol is a Disease, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1987, at 35 ("My alcoholism is a disease, medically treatable. But my ongo-
ing recovery depends on making healthy responsible choices every day."), quoted in Richard
C. Bold The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2274
n.103 (1992).
58 See id. at n.48.
59 State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328,331 (S.C. 1977) (quoting 22 CJ.S. CriminalLaw § 66
(1961)).
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Although the recent trend has been to increase the legal respon-
sibility of intoxicated offenders, most states still consider a state of in-
capacitating intoxication as warranting partial mitigation. Part III
describes the two major doctrines through which states achieve a com-
promise of partial responsibility.
III. THE PARTIAL RESPONSBlLITY DocrRiNEs
Most states maintain a compromise position through which intox-
ication evidence is admissible to defend against some charges but not
others. The two major doctrinal methods for achieving this compro-
mise are the "specific intent" doctrine and the Model Penal Code
rule. This Part examines these two frameworks currently used by
thirty-seven states and the federal courts.
Courts developed the distinction between specific and general in-
tent crimes in response to the problem of the intoxicated offender.60
The "specific intent" doctrine serves as a "compromise between the
conflicting feelings of sympathy and reprobation for the intoxicated
offender."61 Intoxication evidence is admissible in prosecutions for
offenses containing a "specific intent"62 as an element, but is immate-
60 See, e.g., People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
61 Id. "On the one hand, the moral culpability of a drunken criminal is frequently less
than that of a sober person effecting a like injury. On the other hand, it is commonly felt
that a person who voluntarily gets drunk and while in that state commits a crime should
not escape the consequences." Id.
62 This intent may resemble the Model Penal Code's definition of "purpose." See Peo-
ple v. Zekany, 833 P.2d 774, 778 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). Some jurisdictions, however, in-
clude crimes requiring only "knowledge" as specific intent crimes. See, e.g., State v.
Primeaux, 328 N.W.2d 256, 259 (S.D. 1982); State v. D'Amico, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (Vt.
1978). California has classified implied malice murder, which requires an "actual[] ap-
preciatfion]" of risk, as a specific intent crime. See People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 278,
281 (Cal. 1994). See also WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusrN W. Scor, JiL, SuBsrANTrvF CRIMINAL
LAw 305-06 (1986) [hereinafter LAFAvE & ScoTr].
The Model Penal Code's four culpability states are defined in pertinent part:
(2) KINDS OF CuLPABiLIry DEFINED.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i)
if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the
element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the
element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his
conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such nature and degree
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rial in prosecutions for crimes requiring only a "general intent" 63
The California Supreme Court distinguished specific intent from
general intent offenses in the widely cited case of People v. Hood.64
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a
future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent.
When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act
or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one
of specific intent.65
The essential distinction is thus between the intent to commit an act
(general intent) and the intent to produce a consequence (specific
intent) .66
The distinction is far from perfect. Even the Hood court acknowl-
edged the difficulty in applying the distinction. "There is no real dif-
ference, however, only a linguistic one, between an intent to do an act
already performed and an intent to do that same act in the future."67
Any general intent crime may thus be defined as a specific intent
crime as well. 68 An even more basic problem is that an actor who is so
intoxicated that he is unable to intend a proscribed consequence is
likely to be similarly unable to intend a forbidden act.69
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involve a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
63 See, e.g., State v. Bitting, 291 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. 1971).
64 462 P.2d 370, 377-78 (Cal. 1969).




69 The Hood court recognized the technical limitations of the doctrine. The court con-
cluded that intoxication could be a defense to offenses requiring an intended conse-
quence but not to those requiring only an intended act because the latter were so likely to
be committed while intoxicated. Id. at 379.
The compiled data reveal otherwise. The following surveys have shown that offenses
defined by California law as specific intent offenses (homicide [murder], robbery and bur-
glary) are more frequently committed while intoxicated than those (assault, sex offenses)
classified as general intent.
The five columns reflect the following- (a) a 1991 United States Department ofJustice
survey interviewing prison inmates about their criminal experiences; (b) a 1989 study using
the same process; (c) a 1991 Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program which tested arrestees'
urine samples for recent illegal drug use (not necessarily at the time of the offense); (d)
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There is no intrinsic meaning to the terms "specific intent" and
"general intent";70 they are merely the means through which states
achieve the compromise of partial liability and partial mitigation. 7'
"General intent" and "specific intent" are shorthand devices best
and most precisely invoked to contrast offenses that, as a matter of pol-
icy, may be punished despite the actor's voluntary intoxication (general
intent) with offenses that, also as a matter of policy, may not be punished
in light of such intoxication if it negates the offense's mental element
(specific intent).72
Because of the technical difficulties involved in applying the specific
intent doctrine, the Model Penal Code developed a new method for
achieving partial responsibility for intoxicated offenders.
The Model Penal Code allows intoxication evidence to be admit-
ted in prosecutions for crimes requiring purpose or knowledge, but
not in those requiring only recklessness or negligence. 73 The Model
the 1989 DUF study; and (e) a 1951-1953 study of the Columbus, Ohio Police Department
testing arrestees' urine samples for alcohol.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Assault 49 59 48 55 44
Sex Offenses 41 46 37 44 45
Homicide 52 69 48 57 66
Robbery 52 53 65 73 59
Burglary N/A 58 68 75 65
See SuRvEy, supra note 10, at 26; SoURceBOoK-1992, supra note 11, at 459 tbl. 4.31, 603 tbl.
6.54; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsrIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsCE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
Jus-IcE STAIsTIcs 1991, at 473 tbl. 4.32 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds.,
1992); Ralph Slovenko, Alcoholism and the Criminal Law, 6 WASHBURN LJ. 269, 273 (1967).
The studies seem to confirm that specific intent offenses are more likely to be commit-
ted while intoxicated than general intent offenses. Of course, it is possible that the statis-
tics merely reflect that specific intent offenses are more difficult to commit while
intoxicated, and thus inebriates are more likely to be apprehended when they commit
such offenses. See id. at n.8.
70 People v. Kelley, 176 N.W.2d 435, 443 (Mich. CL App. 1970); Hall, supra note 48, at
1064.
71 FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 850.
72 People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 287 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk,J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (emphasis added); see also People v. Gutierrez, 225 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887 (CL App. 1986).
73 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (1962). See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 62, for
definitions of purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently. Some states have absorbed
the Model Penal Code approach into the specific intent doctrine.
Specific intent crimes would be limited only to those crimes which are required to be
committed either purposefully or knowingly, while general intent crimes would en-
compass those crimes which can be committed either recklessly or negligently. Thus,
in order to commit a specific intent crime, an offender would have to subjectively
desire or know that the prohibited result will occur, whereas in a general intent crime,
the prohibited result need only be reasonably expected to follow from the offender's
voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.
State v. Primeaux, 328 N.W.2d 256, 259 (S.D. 1982) (quoting State v. Rush, 294 N.W.2d
416, 417 (S.D. 1980)). Accord State v. D'Amico, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084, (Vt. 1978). But see
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Penal Code also provides that "[w]hen recklessness establishes an ele-
ment of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been
sober, such unawareness is immaterial."74
A tentative draft of the Model Penal Code explains the policy's
rationale.
[T]here is the fundamental point that awareness of the potential
consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to
gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in our
culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence between
the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks cre-
ated by his conduct in becoming drunk. Becoming so drunk as to de-
stroy temporarily the actor's powers of perception and of judgment is
conduct which plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance
the potential danger. The actor's moral culpability lies in engaging in
such conduct.75
The rationale for excluding intoxication evidence in crimes requiring
only recklessness is readily apparent "the element of recklessness
itself-defined as conscious disregard of a substantial risk-encom-
passes the risks created by [a] defendant's conduct in getting
drunk."76 Many state codes, as well as federal law, have adopted the
Model Penal Code policy.77
Some states preclude intoxication evidence from being admitted
People v. Zekany, 833 P.2d 774, 778 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (specific intent crimes require
purpose, general intent crimes require knowledge). The Primeaux definition of general
intent does not completely comport with the Model Penal Code concept of recklessness,
which requires the "conscious[ ] disregard [of] a . .. risk." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2) (c) (1962). Primeaux defines a general intent crime as one where the prohibited
result must be reasonably expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, not a risk which
is consciously disregarded. Primeaux, 328 N.W.2d at 259.
74 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1962).
75 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, at 8-9 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959). The draft also noted
"the impressive difficulties posed in litigating the foresight of any particular actor at the
time when he imbibes and the relative rarity of cases where intoxication really does engen-
der unawareness as distinguished from imprudence." I& See also State v. Honeycutt, 693
S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (quoting Atkins v. State, 105 S.W. 353, 361
(Tenn. 1907)):
Instances, however, of heinous offenses, committed under [incapacitating intoxica-
tion], are believed to be of rare occurrence. They are much oftener the result of that
midway state of intoxication which, although sufficient to stimulate the evil-disposed
to actions correspondent with their feelings, would not excite the good man to crimi-
nal deeds. It is generally the drunken man acting out the sober man's intent. He says
and does when drunk what he thinks when sober.
76 People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983).
77 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,§ 37(2) (West 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(Hl)(c) (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 15.05(3) (McKinney 1984); United States v. Johnson, 879 F.2d 331, 334 n.1 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 948 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984). See also infra
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MiTC-ELL KE!TER
in prosecutions for knowing crimes, permitting such evidence only
when the crime charged requires purpose.78 This is a reasonable ex-
tension of the Model Penal Code policy, as the difference between
knowledge and recklessness is a narrow one, the degree of risk per-
ceived.79 Such a quantitative difference hardly forms a qualitative dif-
ference around which to base a policy distinguishing offenses which
warrant punishment despite intoxication and those which do not.
Twelve states, including Montana, follow the common law rule
that intoxicated offenders are fully responsible for their conduct, re-
gardless of their intoxication.80 Part IV places the issue of harms com-
mitted while intoxicated in context with other unintentional harms
and concludes that an intoxication "defense" is a criminal law
anomaly.
IV. THE ANoMALous DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
"The broad purposes of the criminal law are.. . to make people
do what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing
what society regards as undesirable."8 ' The law may therefore punish
actors whose behavior is both deterrable and socially harmful.8 2 Full
responsibility states have recognized that both grounds warrant pun-
ishing intoxicated offenders. A survey of criminal defenses reveals
that unintentional harm due to intoxication is different from any
other unintentional harm.83 States may therefore deny intoxication
any exculpatory value in their pursuit of public safety.
78 See, e.g., Alaska Star. § 11.81.900(a) (2) (Michie 1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-
103(2) (West 1994) ("Diminished responsibility due to lack of mental capacity or self-in-
duced intoxication is not a defense to murder in the second degree."); id. § 18-1-804(1)
("Intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge... but in a prosecution
for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant
when it is relevant to negative the existence of a specific intent if such intent is an element
of the crime charged.").
79 Ohio law, for instance, distinguishes knowledge, which describes the perception of a
.probable" result, and recklessness, which describes the perception of a "likely" result.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(B),(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
80 See infra Appendix. Two of these states, Pennsylvania and Virginia, admit evidence of
intoxication to evaluate a murderer's mental state and determine the degree of murder,
but exclude it in every other prosecution. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1983);
Chittum v. Commonwealth, 174 S.E.2d 779, 783 (Va. 1970).
81 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 62, at 30.
82 People v. Hoy, 158 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Mich. 1968).
83 Some specific intent crimes are defined in such a way that where there is no intent,
the act itself is not harmful. For instance, a statute may proscribe touching a child's geni-
tals with a lewd intent. If, however, a mother touches her infant's genitals while washing
the baby, without any lewd intent, there is not only no harmful intent, there is also no
harmful act. In these cases, the intent of the actor determines the harm of the act. Such
analysis does not apply to homicides committed while intoxicated; the victim is no less
dead when killed by an inebriate than when killed by a sober assailant.
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The law excuses some actors who cause harm unintentionally be-
cause they lack the capacity to intend the harm.8 4 Insanity, infancy
and involuntary intoxication are recognized as defenses based on the
defendant's criminal incapacity.85 Individuals described by these con-
ditions cannot choose to create or avoid creating harms, and there-
fore they are not punished.86 The other position asserts that moral
culpability is a prerequisite for punishment, and thus those who lack
the capacity to determine their conduct connot be blamed for their
actions or their consequences. 87
The law also recognizes the affirmative defenses of necessity, du-
ress and self-defense.88 These defenses are available to individuals
who commit the elements of a crime to avoid a greater harm.89 The
law does not seek to modify such individuals' behavior because, under
the circumstances, it enhances social utilityP0
Accidents also produce harm without intent; however, accidents
are, by definition, not deterrable. "Accidents occur by chance, with-
out the contribution of human action."91 Since no human action con-
tributed to the harm, there is no action for the law to deter.9 2
The intoxication "defense" most closely resembles a mistake of
fact "defense." Neither affirmatively exculpates; rather, they represent
a failure of proof of an essential element (the requisite mens rea) of
the crime, as evaluated in the act-oriented framework. The two are
closely related. A mistake of fact may occur when a person shoots at
what she believes to be a tree but is actually a person.95 The voluntary
84 DAVID A. JONES, CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBrIMY 44 (1978).
85 Id.
86 Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 401, 414 n.31
(1958).
87 See FLETcHER, supra note 9, at 804-05.
88 LAFAvE & ScOTr, supra note 62, at 614, 627, 649.
89 Id. The law recognizes a non-aggressor's suffering of harm to be a greater evil than
the aggressor's suffering of comparable harm. However, the law does not allow an individ-
ual to respond to nonlethal force with lethal force, suggesting that the non-aggressor's
suffering of a slight injury may be a lesser evil than the aggressor's suffering of death. Id. at
657-58.
90 Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Maryrs and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Prob-
lem of Crime Control 94 YALE LJ. 315, 324 (1984).
91 FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 488.
92 Harm which results from culpable negligence is punishable, unlike accidental
harms. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5, 192, 192.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
98 FzCHER, supra note 9, at 487. A sober person's unawareness of the wrongfulness of
excessive drug or alcohol consumption, however, more closely resembles a mistake of law
defense. Mistake of law is generally not regarded as a valid defense because it replaces
objective societal norms with the subjective beliefs of the offender in a manner which un-
dermines the "general good." LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 62, at 587 (quoting OLrvE W.
HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 48 (1881)); cf United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1184
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
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consumption of intoxicants is an act likely to produce such a
mistake. 94
There is a significant difference, though, both with respect to cul-
pability and deterrence, between an actor who shoots a human being
because of a mistake due to voluntary intoxication and one whose mis-
take stems from another source. One who voluntarily creates the con-
dition which causes him to act unreasonably is more blameworthy
than one whose inability to evaluate circumstances correctly is due to
a lack of intelligence or other factors beyond his control.95 In volun-
tarily forfeiting his ability to avoid mistakes, he forfeits the deserved
application of the excuse.96 "A mistake or accident may happen to a
man, whether drunk or sober, and if they are more likely to occur
when in the former predicament, he is not entitled to any advantage
over the sober man by reason of this."97 Furthermore, the law can
deter stupefaction, but it cannot deter stupidity.98
94 See State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 206-07 (Iowa 1974).
95 People v. Langworthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 179-80 (Mich. 1982).
96 Cf Model Penal Code § 210.3 commentary at 64 (1985). "[E]xtreme emotional dis-
turbance will not reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor has intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently brought about his own mental disturbance. .. ." Ia
97 State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332, 337 (1858).
98 The law may deter some mistakes, but at a very high cost. Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1221, 1226 (1985). For in-
stance, several jurisdictions punish a homicide committed in the actual but unreasonable
belief that lethal force is necessary for self-defense as voluntary manslaughter. E.g., People
v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979). Such a mistaken belief, although unreasonable, is still
a valid defense to murder because of the cost of overdeterrence. The law has no interest in
deterring those who act reasonably to defend themselves. If the law punished unreasona-
ble self-defense too severely, it could deter reasonable self-defense also, since those who
perceive imminent harm may have difficulty deciding quickly whether self-defense is rea-
sonable, and what degree of force is warranted. "Detached reflection cannot be de-
manded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343
(1921). If the law deters those who otherwise would have acted reasonably in self-defense,
the result could be serious harm or even death to those who were blameless and entitled to
defend themselves. The death of innocent people would be a grave social harm.
No comparable social harm would result from overdeterring intoxication. There
would likely be less illegal drug and alcohol consumption, which would produce societal
benefits beyond a decrease in crimes following such consumption. Furthermore, exclud-
ing intoxication evidence could deter sober or mildly intoxicated individuals who would no
longer be able to commit crimes expecting to fabricate an intoxication defense. "All that a
crafty criminal would require for a well-planned murder.., would be a revolver in one
hand to commit the deed, and a quart of intoxicating liquor in the other with which to
build his excusable defense." State v. Arsenault, 124 A.2d 741, 746 (Me. 1956). Cf David
Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 359, 371 (1985) (felony murder rule deters intentional killings as well as accidental
ones, by depriving killer of opportunity to fabricate defense that homicide was accidental);
Loewy, supra note 22, at 291.
Such "crafty" criminals have already appeared in Canada since Daviault. See supra note
23. One victimized woman told how "her husband came home sober, beat her up and
then proceeded to get drunk while holding the telephone in his lap. When he had con-
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A policy of excluding evidence of an offender's voluntary intoxi-
cation comports with the general rule that criminal defenses are un-
available to actors who are at fault in creating the conditions
supporting the defense. Actors who culpably create circumstances
which require them to commit the otherwise excusable harm may not
cite such circumstances in their defense. Neither the affirmative de-
fenses of self-defense, 99 duress, 100 necessity, 101 nor the mitigating
grounds of provocation' 0 2 and extreme emotional disturbance 03 are
available to actors who cause their predicament.
The exclusion of intoxication as an exculpatory factor represents
a considered policy choice that an individual who knowingly casts off
the restraint and judgment of sobriety does not deserve to plead that
he would not have committed the harm when sober.
[Principles of fundamental justice] encompass as an essential attri-
bute and are predicated upon the moral responsibility of every person of
sound mind for his or her acts. The requirement of mens rea is an appli-
cation of this principle. To allow generally an accused who is not af-
flicted by disease of the mind to plead absence of mens rea would be to
undermine, indeed negate, that very principle which the requirement of
mens rea is intended to give effect to. 104
New York courts have recognized that intoxication turns men into
"beasts preying upon society,"10 5 and thus such inebriates are as re-
sponsible for subsequent harm as if they unleashed an actual danger-
ous animal upon defenseless victims.' 0 6 One who releases a pit bull
into a room of helpless infants is responsible not because he con-
trolled the animal's actions in killing a child, but because he volunta-
rily forfeited his control over the dog. A similar rationale applies to
inebriates.
Jerome Hall, in arguing for increased mitigation for intoxicated
offenders, asserted that the severely intoxicated often lack ethical sen-
sitivity.10 7 In light of the devastating consequences which extreme in-
toxication produces, one may ask whether ethical insensitivity is a
result of excessive intoxication or its cause.
sumed two cases of beer, he threw the phone at her and said, 'Now phone the cops, you
bitch.'" Elizabeth Sheehy, The Intoxication Defense in Canada: Why Women Should Care, 24
CoNmTmp. DRUG PROBS. 595, 611 (1996).
99 IAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 62, at 657-58.
100 See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d, 1139, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 62, at 640.
102 State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (N.M. 1979).
103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1985).
104 Daviault v. The Queen [1994] 8 S.C.R. 119 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
105 People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392, 895 (N.Y. Ulster Oyer & Terminer 1875).
106 People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983).
107 Hall, supra note 48, at 1065.
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There are many defenses which apply to actors who commit unin-
tentional harms. These include insanity, infancy, involuntary intoxica-
tion, mistake, duress, necessity and self-defense. Some of these cover
actions the law cannot deter, and others cover actions the law should
not deter, because they benefit society. Alternatively, some of these
defenses cover actors who cannot be blamed because of their incapac-
ity, and others cover actors who cannot be blamed because their ac-
tions benefit society.108 Voluntary intoxication stands out as a defense
offered by those who can be and should be deterred.
In 1987, Montana embraced these arguments and enacted legisla-
tion ascribing equal legal responsibility to sober and intoxicated of-
fenders alike.10 9 The United States Supreme Court's 1996 review of
that statute produced the Court's first detailed analysis of the intoxica-
tion defense in more than a century. 110 Part V examines the issues
raised in Montana v. Egelhoff.111
V. MONTANA v EGELHOFF. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
REVIEWS THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY RULE
In 1987, the Montana Legislature amended its law to provide as
follows:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsi-
ble for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless the
defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating sub-
stance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise in-
gested the substance causing the condition. 112
At the conclusion of James Egelhoff's trial for the murders of Roberta
Pavola and John Christianson, the court read the statute as an instruc-
tion to the jury, which then convicted Egelhoff of two counts of delib-
erate homicide. 113
The Montana statute is a composite of the two methods by which
states provide for full responsibility for intoxicated offenders. The
first section, which declares an inebriate "criminally responsible for
his conduct," resembles Mississippi's doctrine, which declares, "If a
defendant, when sober, is capable of distinguishing between right and
wrong, and the defendant voluntarily deprives himself of the ability to
108 See supra notes 84-87.
109 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1987).
110 See Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 638-34 (1882).
111 Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
112 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
113 State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 263 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (omit-
ing the words "smoked, sniffed, injected or otherwise ingested" from its instruction).
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distinguish between right and wrong by reason of becoming intoxi-
cated and commits an offense while in that condition, he is criminally
responsible for such acts."114 The second part of section 45-2-203,
which declares that intoxication "is not a defense," resembles the laws
of Arizona, n 5 Arkansas, 116 Delaware, 117 Georgia,118 Hawaii, 119 Penn-
sylvania,120 South Carolina, 121 Texas, 122 and Virginia.123 Further-
more, Missouri law resembles the Montana statute in combining the
"criminal responsibility" and "no defense" provisions. 124
At the trial, the prosecution presented compelling evidence
which showed that Egelhoff fatally shot Pavola and Christianson. Po-
lice found a station wagon with Egelhoff lying in the back seat, with
the two deceased victims, Egelhoff's gun and two empty casings in
front.125 Police tests revealed Egelhoff had gunshot residue on his
hands and a blood alcohol count of .36 percent. 26 The trial court
allowed the jury to consider Egelhoff's intoxication in determining
whether he committed the physical acts necessary to complete the
murder, but not in determining whether Egelhoff killed "knowingly"
or "purposely" as required by Montana law for a deliberate homicide
conviction. 27 The Montana Supreme Court reversed Egelhoff's con-
victions, finding the instruction violated his constitutional right to
present a defense. 128
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion upheld the statute as a legitimate
rule excluding relevant evidence for valid policy reasons.129 Justice
114 McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially con-
curring).
115 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-503 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
116 White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784, 787-88 (Ark. 1986).
117 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995); Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649, 654 (Del. 1986).
118 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4(c) (1994).
119 HAv. REv. STAT. § 702-230(2) (1993); State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1385-86 (Haw.
1991).
120 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996).
121 State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977).
122 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (West 1994).
12 Chittum v. Commonwealth, 174 S.E.2d 779, 783 (Va. 1970).
124 State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
125 State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 262 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
126 Id.
127 1& at 262-63.
128 Id. at 266. Any partial responsibility state law which excludes evidence of intoxica-
tion where it may have affected the defendant's mental state could conceivably be charac-
terized as an unconstitutional restriction of a defendant's right to present a defense. Oral
Argument Transcript, Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) available in WESTLAW,
1996 WL 134508, at *14. Indeed, Egelhoff acknowledged during oral argument that he
considers the Model Penal Code policy unconstitutional, as it denies a defendant an op-
portunity to show he lacked the requisite subjective awareness of the risk. Id.
129 Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017-24 (1996).
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Scalia dismissed the "proposition that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees the right to introduce all relevant evidence" as "simply indefen-
sible."1 30 The plurality opinion noted other instances where relevant
evidence may be excluded, i.e., on grounds of privilege, prejudice,
confusion, unreliability, or failure to comply with procedural require-
ments.13 ' The Due Process Clause permits states to regulate judicial
procedures unless these rules offend "some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."'132 The absence of any intoxication defense at com-
mon law, and the contemporary popularity of the full responsibility
rule compelled the conclusion that there was no fundamental right to
introduce intoxication evidence. 133
The plurality opinion properly qualified the Montana Supreme
Court's interpretation of Chambers v. Mississippi.'34 A defendant has a
fundamental right to present a defense, but only if state law recog-
nizes the defense as valid.'3 5 The Montana Supreme Court had cited
Martin v. Ohio,'36 which held, inter alia, that a defendant had a right to
present evidence to the jury that he killed in self-defense, even if he
failed to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, as
state law required. 137 However, Martin provided no support for Egel-
hoff. Ohio law recognized as exculpatory evidence a showing that the
defendant acted in self-defense, whereas Montana law expressly de-
nies intoxication evidence any exculpatory value.' 3 8 Similarly, Cham-
bers v. Mississippi protected the defendant's right to show he was not
factually guilty of the charged murder because someone else had com-
mitted it.139 Martin and Chambers stand merely for the uncontroversial
proposition that a defendant may present evidence which the law rec-
ognizes as material to a determination of his guilt of the crime
charged.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion read the Montana statute not as a re-
130 Id. at 2017.
131 Id.
132 Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
'33 Id. at 2017-21.
'34 See id. at 2021-22 (discussing the holding in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973)).
135 Id. at 2022.
136 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
137 Id. at 233-34.
138 Compare Ohio v. Martin, 488 N.E.2d 166, 167-68 (Ohio 1986) with MoNr. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-203 (1995).
139 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 297. The trial court followed this precedent in allowing Egel-
hoff to introduce intoxication evidence to show he was physically unable to commit the




striction on evidence but as a substantive rule of criminal law.140 Her
concurrence found that Montana had redefined the requisite mens
rea for deliberate homicide by adopting section 45-2-203 of the Mon-
tana Code.141 "To obtain a conviction, the, prosecution must prove
only that (1) the defendant caused the death of another with actual
knowledge or purpose, or (2) that the defendant killed 'under circum-
stances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose "but for"
[the defendant's] voluntary intoxication.'" 142 Justice Ginsburg's opin-
ion answered the Montana Supreme Court's citation to In re Win-
ship's'43 rule-that a state must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged' 44-by noting "[t]he applicability of the reason-
able-doubt standard... has always been dependent on how a State
defines the offense that is charged."1 45
The dissents' 46 agreed with the principle that a rule holding an
intoxicated person fully responsible for his acts violated no constitu-
tional protection. Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter refused,
140 Egelwiff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 2024 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
142 Id. (quoting Brief for American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities et al. at 6,
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566)).
143 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
144 Id. at 364.
145 Egeloff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12
(1977)).
It is axiomatic that a state's authority to define valid defenses is coextensive with its
authority to define offenses. For instance, some states require a showing that a defendant
engaged in conduct for the purpose of causing death for a murder conviction. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a(a) (West 1994); OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (Banks-
Baldwin 1992). Some states require knowledge. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1105(A) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
Some states require recklessness. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b (1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (1995 & Supp. 1996). Some require only negligence. See, e.g.,
State v. Michaud, 513 A.2d 842, 846-47 n.1 (Me. 1986); Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen's
Club, 618 A.2d 945, 951 (Pa. Super. CL 1992).
In turn, some states hold that an actor may be held responsible, despite his intoxica-
tion, for crimes requiring negligence. See, e.g., State v. Gates, 462 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Collins, 632 P.2d 68, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). Some permit
responsibility for crimes requiring recklessness. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 37(2) (West 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(2) (1985). Some permit responsibility
for crimes requiring knowledge. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a) (2) (Michie 1995);
COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-103(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). Some permit responsibil-
ity for crimes requiring purpose. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (West 1994); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 562.076(1) (West 1978 & Supp 1996). Defining which facts are necessary to
constitute a crime, and which are immaterial, is the role of a legislature, not a court. Schad
v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637 (1991).
146 See Egefliff, 116 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer); id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(joined by justice Stevens).
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however, to followJustice Ginsburg's finding that Montana had rede-
fined the requisite mens rea since the Montana Supreme Court, the
final authority on Montana law, had found no such redefinition. 47
OnlyJustice Breyer's dissent reserved the question of the constitution-
ality of a hypothetical statute which equated voluntary intoxication
with knowledge or purpose. 148
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. United
States'49 rendered inescapable the conclusion that a defendant has no
constitutional right to introduce evidence of his intoxication. 50 In
Fisher, the Court rejected the defendant's request to instruct the jury
to consider evidence of his mental disorder, which was short of in-
sanity, in determining whether he premeditated and deliberated a
murder.151
[T]here was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of murder in
the first degree, if petitioner was a normal man in his mental and emo-
tional characteristics. But the defense takes the position that the peti-
tioner is fairly entitled to be judged as to deliberation and
premeditation, not by a theoretical normality but by his own personal
traits. In view of the status of the defense of partial responsibility in the
District and the nation no contention is or could be made of the denial
of due process.152
If a defendant has no constitutional right to introduce evidence of a
personal condition for which he might not have been responsible, a
fortiori, he has no right to introduce evidence of a condition which his
own blameworthy conduct created.153
The Montana statute's language stating that "[a] person who is in
an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct" 54
expressed the Montana Legislature's decision to hold intoxicated of-
fenders to the same standards as their sober counterparts. The laws of
the "no defense" states are deficient, however, as they fail to establish
what the State must affirmatively prove. 55 A better rule would state
147 Id. at 2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2032-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 2035 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
149 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
150 Id. at 473-77.
151 Id. at 473.
152 Id. at 466 (citation omitted).
153 United States ex rel. Goddard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929, 935 (3d Cir. 1980). Fisher
noted that a specific Utah statute authorized the admissibility of intoxication evidence to
determine the presence of premeditation. 328 U.S. at 473 n.1 1 (discussing Hopt v. People,
104 U.S. 636, 634 (1881) and Hopt's reliance on section 20 of the Penal Code of Utah
(1876) (codified as UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1995))). The Montana statute specifically
exduded intoxication evidence from the jury's consideration in determining a defendant's
mental state. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
154 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
155 See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed CDiminal LiabiliOty, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 643 n.126 (1984).
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explicitly that an offender's intoxication which prevents him from
forming a required mental state substitutes for that state. Part VI
demonstrates such a rule is consistent with well-established principles
of criminal law.
VI. THE RATIONALE OF THE FuLL RESPONSIBILITY RULE
A state that seeks to hold intoxicated offenders fully responsible
for their conduct may avoid procedural challenges by explicitly declar-
ing that extreme intoxication satisfies the requisite mens rea for a
charged offense. Such a policy would comport with recognized prin-
ciples of criminal liability.
Critics of full responsibility disagree with the policy of holding
individuals responsible for consequences they did not intend, or even
subjectively foresee. 156 Such analysis follows the subjectivist theory
that criminal conduct should be evaluated on the exclusive basis of
the offender's intent. This exclusive focus on the offender's subjec-
tive perspective ignores other important considerations which support
full responsibility.
There are three elements involved in determining an offense's
magnitude: the offender's culpability, the danger posed by the of-
fender's conduct, and the harm which results from it.15 7 The combi-
nation of these three factors determines how the criminal law grades
the offense; more of one factor may compensate for less of another.' 58
A review of basic criminal statutes reveals the interrelation of the
three factors.
First, harm may compensate for culpability. Aggravated battery
in California requires an intent to inflict unlawful force against the
victim's person and a harm of serious injury.159 Involuntary man-
slaughter does not require an intentional infliction of force-a lack of
due care (criminal negligence) is sufficient-but it does require the
greater harm of death.160 The net result is an equal sentence for the
Even the Montana-Missouri combination has its limitations. The Missouri Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of section 562.076.1 of the Missouri Code, which declares in
part that intoxication "does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility," but ruled that
trial courts could not read it as ajury instruction. See State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 483-84
(Mo. 1993). "There are limitless factors, e.g., race, gender, religion, education, etc., that
'do not relieve a person of criminal responsibility,' but no form instruction is given on
these factors." Id. at 483 n.4 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.076.1 (West 1997)).
156 Some states allow the admission of intoxication evidence in defense against a charge
the defendant acted recklessly. See supra note 145.
157 Loewy, supra note 22, at 283.
158 Id.
159 People v. Mansfield, 245 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802-03 (Ct. App. 1988).




The law punishes danger and harm on a similar sliding scale. Ag-
gravated battery carries the same sentence as aggravated assault.'6 2
The former involves serious injury (harm),163 whereas the latter in-
volves the use of a deadly weapon or force likely to produce injury
(danger) .164
As a greater harm compensates for a lesser culpability, and a
greater danger compensates for a lesser harm, a greater danger com-
pensates for a lesser culpability. It is not, as some commentators have
asserted, that an inebriate's culpability equals that of a sober of-
fender, 65 but that the great danger posed by an inebriate to many
victims compensates for his lesser culpability. 66 "[A] drunk is re-
quired to comply with the law while drunk, not because drunkenness
is culpable, but because it is dangerous." 67
It has long been recognized that the crimes that are most danger-
ous to the public168 warrant the most severe punishment. 69 Many
161 Compare Cal. Penal Code § 193 with § 243(d).
162 Compare id. § 243(d) with id. § 245(a).
163 Id. § 243(d).
164 Id. § 245(a).
165 See, e.g., R. W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary Intoxica-
tion as Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.LR. 3d 1236, 1240 (1966).
166 People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (1858). This analysis assumes a constant harm, i.e., a
single death. Id. at 10. Even nonfatal conduct, however, which gravely endangers many
potential victims, such as attempted trainwrecking, may be punished more severely than
the premeditated, purposeful murder of a single victim. People v. Thompson, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 847, 851-52 (Ct. App. 1994).
167 Loewy, supra note 22, at 297. The danger factor also justifies statutes which provide
additional penalties for individuals who commit their offenses with a firearm. Mitchell,
supra note 51, at 3. See also People v. Aguilar, 108 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (Ct. App. 1973).
168 Justice Breyer's Egelhoffdissent evaluated the challenged statute from a subjectivist
perspective; it focused on an offender's culpability without considering his dangerousness.
See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2034-35 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer found absurd the notion that a drunk driver who accelerates into a pedestrian may
be found guilty of murder where a similarly intoxicated driver who collides with another
vehicle may be convicted of manslaughter. Id. at 2035. Justice Breyer understandably
would prefer a rule equating voluntary intoxication with the requisite mens rea. See id.
But, it is not completely unreasonable for a legislature to prescribe punishment in accord-
ance with the objective danger posed by an offender's conduct as well as his subjective
intent. A legislature may reasonably find that an inebriate who decides to practice his
target shooting in the woods threatens public safety less than a similarly intoxicated indi-
vidual who shoots his target practice on a crowded city street.
169 THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN 230 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994). See alsoJEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 168 (H. Bums & H.LA
Hart eds., Athlone Press, 1982). Moses Maimonides, in his twelfth-century work, The Guide
for the Perplexed, cites four factors which determine the severity of punishment. See MosEs
MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 345 (M. Friedlander trans., 2d ed. 1904).
These include the harm caused by the offense, the frequency of the offense, the tempta-
tion the offense poses to the offender, and the difficulty of detecting the offense. 1d. In
light of the proportion of crimes committed while intoxicated, and the addiction of some
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states have developed criminal codes which explicitly recognize that
an act's additional danger may compensate for an actor's reduced cul-
pability. For example, in Tennessee, a second degree murder convic-
tion requires that the killing be a knowing one, 7 0 whereas a reckless
killing "committed as the result of the unlawful throwing, placing or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb" is punishable as first de-
gree murder.' 7 ' Thus a reckless killing which endangers many poten-
tial victims is punished more severely than a knowing killing, and
equally as severely as a premeditated, purposeful killing. 7 2 Washing-
ton law embraces the same principle, but does not list specific reckless
conduct warranting a first degree murder conviction. Washington law
punishes nonintentional homicides which manifest a depraved indif-
ference to human life in general as first degree murder, but otherwise
requires an intent to kill for a second degree murder conviction.' 73
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a killer's
intent is not the only relevant consideration in grading homicides.
[S]ome nonintentional murderers may be among the most danger-
ous and inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring
whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in
the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to
rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as
taking the victim's property. This reckless indifference to the value of
human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an "intent
to kill." Indeed it is for this very reason that the common law and mod-
em criminal codes alike have classified [such] behavior... along with
offenders to alcohol or illegal drugs, all but the last factor appear to support maximum
punishment for those who commit homicides while intoxicated.
170 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (1994).
171 Id. § 39-13-202(a) (3). Intentional, premeditated and deliberate killings are also pun-
ishable as first degree murder. &d § 39-13-202(a) (1).
172 See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1997), which punishes as first degree murder,
inter alia, premeditated, purposeful killings, as well as reckless killings involving poison,
explosive devices, or drive-by shootings.
173 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(1) (a), 9A.32.050(1) (b) (West 1988); State v.
Bowerman, 802 P.2d 116, 123 (Wash. 1990). Alabama's murder statute rests on the same
principle. SeeAIA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (1975). An individual is guilty of murder (Alabama has
only one degree) if he intends another person's death, or if he recklessly exhibits an ex-
treme indifference to human life generally. Id.; Ex parte Washington, 448 So. 2d 404, 408
(Ala. 1984).
Massachusetts law, which defines homicides with common law terms, punishes danger
through sentencing rather than through its definition of offenses. See MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 265, §§ 1, 2 (West 1994). Massachusetts punishes a killing without malice as man-
slaughter;, the possible sentence is two and one-half to twenty years imprisonment. MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 1994). Where a person commits manslaughter by
means of an explosive device, however, he may be sentenced to life imprisonment, as
would be one convicted of murder. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 §§ 1, 2, 13 (West 1994).
In essence, Massachusetts substitutes the great risk of harm to society for the mental state




An offender's intent is not the sine qua non of criminal liability.
Conspiracy is one doctrine which permits an offender's legal re-
sponsibility to exceed his intended result.175 Due to the increased
danger posed by multiple conspirators, the law holds a conspirator
liable for the actual, rather than the intended crime, committed "on
the policy conspirators should be responsible for the criminal harms
they have naturally, probably and foreseeably put in motion."' 76 Thus
an individual who conspires to commit an aggravated assault may be
convicted of first degree murder when the assault results in death.'
77
By joining the conspiracy, the conspirator "forfeit[s] personal iden-
tity," and the right to be held liable only for those acts subjectively
intended.178 An inebriate similarly forfeits personal identity in con-
suming intoxicants to the point of losing his ability to understand his
actions or control them.
Perhaps the most widely recognized example of additional dan-
ger compensating for reduced culpability is the felony-murder rule.
The felony-murder rule and the full responsibility doctrine are closely
related.' 79 The felony-murder rule has also been criticized for erod-
174 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987).
175 See People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Ct. App. 1986).
176 Id. at 847, 849.
177 Id. at 851-53. Assault, of course, is a general intent offense, thus permitting the intro-
duction of intoxication evidence. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36 (West 1988). Washing-
ton, however, allows intoxication evidence to be introduced in a prosecution for any
homicide except for second degree manslaughter. See State v. Collins, 632 P.2d 68, 75
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981). Although intoxication is a factor which will foreseeably turn an
assault into a homicide (in 1991, 3.48% of all homicides were deaths resulting from brawls
prompted by drug or alcohol consumption, SOURCEBOOK-1992, supra note 11, at 386 tbl.
3.139), Washington punishes an intoxicated offender the same regardless of whether the
victim dies or suffers minor injury. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.070, 9A.36.030 (West
1988).
An even more anomalous result occurred in California before California reformed its
law in 1995. Prior to 1995, California punished assaults (committed under the incapacitat-
ing influence of intoxication) on certain victims (peace officers or firefighters) or with
certain weapons (machine-guns or semiautomatic weapons) more severely than it pun-
ished homicides committed under a comparable level of intoxication. See CAL. PENAL CODE
245 (West 1995); supra note 52. Offenders thus received a lighter sentence for killing than
for wounding.
178 Joshua Dressier, Redressing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solu-
tions to an Old Problem, 37 HASr1NGS L.J. 91, 111 (1985).
179 Consuming LSD, for instance, is an inherently dangerous felony supporting a mur-
der conviction for one who kills under the intoxicating influence of the drug. See, e.g.,
Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Moreover, courts have recog-
nized that the administering or furnishing of certain illegal drugs to another person is an
inherently dangerous felony supporting a murder conviction. See, e.g., People v. Mattison,
481 P.2d 193, 198 (Cal. 1971) (methyl alcohol); People v. Poindexter, 330 P.2d 763, 767
(Cal. 1958); People v. Taylor, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290, 295-96 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Taylor,
89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698 (Ct. App. 1970) (heroin); People v. Cline, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 463 (Ct.
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ing the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability.180
On the other hand, the societal interest underlying the felony-murder
rule is the preservation of human life, so often casually forfeited in the
commission of crimes of violence.181 Although the law holds the felon
accountable for consequences he did not intend, "[t]he statute was
adopted for the protection of the community and its residents, not for
the benefit of the lawbreaker."182
By recognizing an intentional act may unintentionally endanger
many innocent victims, both the felony-murder rule and a full respon-
sibility rule protect the community at the expense of the lawbreaker.
The felony-murder rule advances three major functions of punish-
ment deterrence, education and condemnation. These goals likewise
support a full responsibility rule for intoxicated offenders.
The felony-murder rule deters on several levels. It deters against
"accidental" killings during felonies183 and it deters the underlying
felonies themselves, 84 by attaching severe penalties to their potential
consequences. Similarly, a full responsibility rule will deter instances
of severe intoxication' 85 as well as promote responsible behavior by
inebriates, such as locking away firearms and car keys before consum-
App. 1969) (phenobarbital); Ureta v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-76 (Ct. App.
1962) (morphine); Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 858-59 (Nev. 1988) (chlo-
ral hydrate); State v. Taylor, 626 A.2d 201, 202-03 (RI. 1993) (methadone). But see People
v. Taylor, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 448-50 (Ct. App. 1992) (PCP).
Some states have created such a rule by statute. For example, Florida punishes as
capital murder the distribution of dangerous drugs where it results in the death of the
user. F" STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (a) (3) (West 1994). Tennessee punishes reckless killings
which result from the distribution of dangerous drugs as second degree murder, even
though second degree murder in Tennessee ordinarily requires a mental state of knowl-
edge. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210 (1994).
Consumption of a dangerous drug endangers the user either because of the drug's
intrinsic qualities or its capacity to induce the user to harm himself. The drug may kill the
user by directly causing cardiac arrest, for instance, or by inducing him to jump off a roof.
The inherent danger of the drug may also manifest itself where the user pushes another
person from a roof. Drug consumption threatens the safety of the entire community, not
just the health of the user. Taylor, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449 n.17.
The cases which hold that administering drugs to another person is an inherently
dangerous felony vindicate the life of the 'victim" who deliberately consumes the fatal
dose. If the law protects the interests of those who deliberately consume illegal drugs, it
should also protect the interests of their unwilling victims. Homicide is worse than suicide.
180 People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965).
181 Gillespie v. Ryan, 837 F.2d 628, 681 (3d Cir. 1988); Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 370
A.2d 712, 720 (Pa. 1977).
182 People v. Chavez, 234 P.2d 632, 640 (Cal. 1951).
183 Washington, 402 P.2d at 133.
184 Id. at 136 (Burke, J., dissenting).
185 FLzrcmER, supra note 9, at 815. Although an individual may be unable to control
himself once he has become grossly intoxicated, he may avoid becoming grossly intoxi-
cated in the first place. People v. Hoy, 158 N.W.2d 436, 440 (Mich. 1968).
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ing. One who fails to take such precautions is not only more danger-
ous but more culpable as well.' 86 A full responsibility rule deters
sober and mildly intoxicated offenders as well by informing them they
cannot commit crimes and rely on a fabricated intoxication as an
excuse.
187
Far from deterring excessive intoxication, states limiting intoxi-
cated offenders' responsibility effectively subsidize intoxication to the
extent they allow it to exculpate. Limits on their legal responsibility
assure inebriates they may consume dangerous intoxicants, secure in
the knowledge that the law will shield them from serious punishment.
The offender enjoys the "benefits" of the consumption (the perceived
pleasure of intoxication) while the victim (or society) absorbs the
costs.
The criminal law may educate the public as well as deter.'18  The
substantial decline in alcohol-related automobile fatalities in recent
years' 8 9 may have had less to do with drivers actually weighing the
penal disincentives of driving while intoxicated than with the social
stigma which has recently attached to such behavior. 190 An intoxica-
tion defense which permits offenders to attribute their misconduct to
intoxication teaches potential offenders that antisocial behavior is tol-
erated when it is committed under the influence of illegal drugs or
alcohol. 19'
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion cited studies suggesting "that
drunks are violent not simply because alcohol makes them that way,
but because they are behaving in accord with their learned belief that
drunks are violent."192 For example, subjects in a laboratory study
who acted aggressively after being given a placebo in place of alcohol
demonstrated "that the expectation that drinking will stimulate ag-
gressive behavior is sufficient to stimulate aggression."' 93 Another
186 Professor George Fletcher's proposal to punish dangerous intoxication as a distinct
offense, see FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 847-48, 852, fails to promote such precautions. Pro-
fessor Fletcher considers intoxication to be a fixed harm; the punishment should be a
constant, regardless of the extent of subsequent harm to any victims. See id. But such a law
would only deter intoxication; it would not provide the inebriate with incentive to avoid
harming others after he has become intoxicated.
187 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 62, at 657-58.
188 See id. at 34 n.32; FRANKLIN ZIMRING, PERSPECrES ON DETERRENCE 4-5 (1971).
189 The past decade has seen a 30% decline in such deaths. BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTiCs 1993, at 349 tbl.
3.104 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1993].
190 See Franklin E. Zimring, Law, Society, and the Drinking Driver Some Concluding Reflec-
tions, in SocLAi CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER 381 (Michael D. Laurence et al. eds.,
1988).
191 Mitchell, supra note 57, at 86.
192 Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996) (citing Collins, infra note 193).
193 James J. Collins, Suggested Explanatory Frameworks to Clarify the Alcohol Use/liwlence Rela-
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study pointed to differing rules of accountability to explain how mem-
bers of two Central Mexican Indian tribes drank heavily, but in only
one did the members become violent after drinking.194
As intoxication is a factor in the commission of most serious
crimes, there is an urgent need to change public attitudes regarding
its danger. The law cannot prevent every factor which contributes to
crime, or automobile fatalities. Nevertheless it has substantially re-
duced the total number of auto fatalities by singling out for special
punishment the factor common to so many accidents.195 Similarly,
although the law cannot easily erase the personal animosities which
cause intentional homicides and assaults, the law can prevent many
such attacks by punishing a factor common to so many crimes. 196 Ab-
sent the factor of illegal drugs or alcohol, some lethal attacks would
produce only minor injuries, and some would not occur at all.197
One educational benefit of the felony-murder rule is that it ex-
presses a simple, commonsense, readily enforceable and widely known
principle which informs the public about the severe consequences of
dangerous felonies. 198 An assessment of criminal guilt may "depend
upon whether [the actor] has been put on notice of his duty to use his.
ability to a degree which makes his unawareness of the duty... genu-
inely blameworthy."' 99 Nothing would more surely remove any ambi-
guity regarding an individual's duty to avoid the well-known dangers
of severe intoxication than replacing the confusing specific/general
intent doctrine with an easy to understand rule that intoxication is not
an excuse for criminal conduct.200
Finally, the felony-murder rule fulfills the function of condemn-
ing unacceptable behavior. If punishment tells the members of a
community what it considers wrong, the absence of punishment must
tionship, 15 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 107, 115 (1988), cited in Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2021. See
also NATIONAL INST. OFJUS-ICE, ALCOHOL USE & CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 16 (1981).
194 NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 193, at 14-15.
195 See People v. Bennett, 819 P.2d 849, 853 (Cal. 1991).
196 Intoxication is a more common factor in conventional homicides than in traffic fatal-
ities. See SOURCEBOOK-1992, supra note 11, at 349 tbl. 3.104; SuRvEy, supra note 10, at 26.
197 In 1993, 2.76% of all homicides nationwide were deaths caused by brawls due to the
influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. BuREAu OFJUsTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
SOURCE-OOK OF CIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, at 334 tbl. 3.111 (Kathleen Maguire &
Ann L Pastore eds., 1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1994].
198 Crump & Crump, supra note 98, at 370-71.
199 Hart, supra note 86, at 417.
200 See Atkins v. State, 105 S.W. 353, 361 (Tenn. 1907).
All civilized governments must punish the culprit who relies on so untenable a defense
[i.e., intoxication]; and in doing so they preach a louder lesson of morality to all those
who are addicted to intoxication, and to parents and to guardians, and to youth and




tell them what it does not consider wrong.2 0' For this reason, a com-
munity which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end up con-
doning the crime.202
Punishment also expresses the community's solidarity with the
victims of crime.203 The Bible manifests this concept by providing
that a monetary fine could serve as a penalty for a property offense,
but was an insufficient response to a homicide.2 04 Society devalues
human life when it allows it to be taken at minimal cost.2 05 A full
responsibility rule, like the felony-murder rule, reaffirms the sanctity
of human life by prescribing punishment commensurate with the
gravity of its wrongful taking.20 6 The burden of injustice properly lies
with the offender, not the victim.
Perhaps the most important message sent by punishment is that
the law continues to protect the community from harm.20 7 Insuffi-
cient punishment of intoxicated offenders communicates to the pub-
lic that there is a class of persons, able and likely to inflict harm on
others, whom the law is powerless to restrain.
The ordinary citizen who is badly beaten up would rightly think lit-
tle of the criminal law as effective protection if, because his attacker had
deprived himself of the ability to know what he was doing by getting
himself drunk or going on a trip with drugs, the attacker is to be held
innocent of any crime in the assault.2 08
The state has a duty to its people to maintain peace and order 209
201 WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 495.
202 Id. Accordingly, a sentence should lead to "community condemnation, or the reaf-
firmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms them-
selves." State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
203 Crump & Crump, supra note 98, at 368.
204 See Exodus 21:37, 22:3-6; Numbers 35:31; Deuteronomy 21:1-9. See also MAiMONIDES, supra
note 169, at 344. The principle retains its relevance today. The recent debate over the
alleged racial disparity in capital sentencing reflects how punishment demonstrates respect
for crime victims. Regarding statistics showing that murderers of white victims were more
likely to receive the death penalty than murderers of black victims, one commentator
stated, "[T]he cultural message is unmistakable: murderers of whites are more seriously
punished than murderers of blacks because white lives are more highly valued than black
lives." The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REv. 119, 157 (1987).
The message is unmistakable; punishment of a wrongdoer expresses society's value of his
victim.2 0 5 JAMFES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABotrr CRIME 207 (1977). See also Mitchell Keiter, Why
Should Murderers Get Parole?, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at B7.
206 Crump & Crump, supra note 98, at 368.
207 Id.
208 Loewy, supra note 22, at 297 (quoting D.P.P. v. Majewski, 2 All E.R. 142, 171 (1976)).
See also State v. Gamron, 182 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Neb. 1970) ("The lives and property of the
public are entitled to protection against the criminal conduct of those who become volun-
tarily intoxicated.").
209 See Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934). See also People ex. rel Gallo v.
Acuna, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 284 (Cal. 1997).
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which it breaches when it excuses its most dangerous offenders.210 So-
ciety must not invite the menace of extreme intoxication by exculpat-
ing those who create it.
Opponents of the felony-murder rule may likewise oppose a full
responsibility doctrine for intoxicated offenders which might increase
the distance between the offender's legal guilt and moral culpabil-
ity.2 11 But an exclusively subjectivist framework for evaluating crimi-
nal conduct imposes costs on the rest of the community. Applying
different legal standards to judge sober and intoxicated offenders un-
dermines four major purposes of criminal punishment.
By evaluating the abnormal individual on his terms, it decreases the
incentives for him to behave as if he were normal. [Deterrence.] It blurs
the law's message that there are certain minimal standards of conduct to
which every member of society must conform. [Education.] By restrict-
ing the extreme condemnation of liability for murder to cases where it is
fully warranted in a relativistic sense, diminished responsibility under-
cuts the social purpose of condemnation. [Condemnation.] And the
factors that call for mitigation under this doctrine are the very aspects of
an individual's personality that make us most fearful of his future con-
duct. [Danger Control.] 212
The question underlying the merits of both the felony-murder rule
and the full responsibility rule is whether the criminal law is written to
protect the interests of the community and its residents (including
inebriates), or the interests of the lawbreaker.213 There is no particu-
lar method mandated by law for balancing the interests of intoxicated
offenders and their victims. Part VII submits that courts must there-
fore respect legislatures' choices in resolving this tension.
VII. WHO DECIDES?
The extent to which intoxicated actors should be held responsi-
ble for their conduct is a policy choice, on which reasonable minds
210 A common feature of homicides committed during felonies or under the influence
of intoxicants (or with a firearm) is that they are more likely to victimize a person unknown
to the offender. People are particularly fearful of being victimized by strangers. Crump &
Crump, supra note 98, at 366 n.31. There are several reasons why the law treats the killing
of a stranger as a graver harm than a killing of an acquaintance or relative. One, the
former are considerably more difficult for police to solve. Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of
Public Order, ATLArim MONTHLY, July 1995, at 39, 46. Two, the stranger had neither warn-
ing nor any possible blame for the killer's motive, which may not always be true when the
victim was specifically selected by the killer. Third, there is the concern of recidivism.
Whereas the killer of an acquaintance or relative may confine his malice to that particular
victim, one who kills a stranger is capable of killing anyone.
211 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 71-72 (1962); Constructive Murder, supra
note 3, at 81.
212 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 71-72 (1962).
213 See People v. Chavez, 234 P.2d 632, 640 (Cal. 1951).
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may differ. The ultimate question is not which choice is superior but
who should make the choice. The challenged Montana statute re-
flects the people of Montana's choice about their preferences, and
therefore deserves respect from the United States Supreme Court.2 14
Outside of Prohibition, Americans have always had a right to
drink, tempered by a responsibility to avoid an extreme level of intoxi-
cation, in which "they [would] be like beasts preying upon society."215
To the extent that states limit the legal responsibility of intoxicated
offenders, there is a qualified right to immunity from the conse-
quences of one's acts while stuporous. This result follows Roscoe
Pound's analysis of American legal development. "[T] he whole em-
phasis is on liberty as contrasted with order, on rights as contrasted
with duties .... on the danger of governmental oppression as con-
trasted with the menace of anti-social individual action."216
Creating new rights for some individuals necessarily imposes costs
on others.
The idea of individual responsibility has been submerged in individ-
ual rights-rights or demands to be guaranteed by Big Brother and de-
livered by public and private institutions. The cost of sloth, gluttony,
alcoholic intemperance, reckless driving, sexual frenzy and smoking
have now become a national, not an individual responsibility, and all
justified as individual freedom. But one man's or woman's freedom in
health is now another man's shackle in taxes and insurance
premiums. 217
Other such shackles borne by the public are diminished physical
safety and the fear it produces. As offenders benefit from the "right"
to mitigated punishment, the community suffers the burden of a re-
duced ability to deter, incapacitate or condemn its most dangerous
members.2 18
Viewed another way, the issue presents individual rights in con-
flict. An individual's right to be excused for unintended conse-
quences competes with an individual's right to personal security.219
214 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992).
215 People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392, 395 (N.Y. Ulster Oyer & Terminer 1875).
216 RoscoE POUND, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AMERICA 132 (1930).
217 Ajzenstadt & Burtch, supra note 51, at 129 n.8 (quotingJohn Knowles, the late Presi-
dent of the Rockefeller Foundation).
218 Japanese culture places a far greater emphasis on the individual's duties to his neigh-
bors than on his rights from the state. WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 456. This
ethos may have helped Japan limit the incidence of crime. The United States has a per
capita murder rate which is 9.7 times that ofJapan, an aggravated assault rate which is 81.5
times that ofJapan, and a robbery rate 146 times as high. Nicholas D. Kristof, Japanese Say
No to Crime: Tough Methods, at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1995, § 1, at 1. Underreporting
appears to be a greater problem in the United States, suggesting the actual disparity could
be even greater. Id
219 Craig v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565, 570 (Ct. App. 1976) (Elkington, J.,
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Although Jerome Hall once described the "severe punishment for
harms committed under gross intoxication" as a "social tragedy,"220
the families of Roberta Payola and John Christianson might consider
the real tragedy not the subsequent punishment ofJames Egelhoff but
the harms he committed in killing two people. The debate reduces to
a value preference: Would people prefer to be safe from punishment
for the unintended consequences of their acts while intoxicated or
safe from the harm of others' unintended acts while intoxicated?
H.L.A. Hart has posited that one function of excuses is to provide
peace of mind to people who would otherwise fear being convicted
and punished for conduct they could not avoid.2 21 In response, Lloyd
Weinreb has contended that more people fear being victimized by an
offender who escapes punishment than fear being punished for
crimes they commit unintentionally.222 Weinreb understands that citi-
zens know they are far more likely to be victims of undeserved harm
than of undeserved punishment.
A Justice Department survey may illuminate the subject. When
asked what threatened their rights and freedoms, eighty-three percent
of the respondents considered crime a "very serious threat," whereas
two percent deemed crime "not much of a threat."223 "Police over-
reaction to crime" was cited by twenty-six percent as a "very serious
threat," and by thirty-two percent as "not much of a threat."2 24 Espe-
cially in the aftermath of the April 19, 1995, bombing of an Oklahoma
City federal building, it is debatable whether more Americans fear the
"danger of governmental oppression" or the "menace of anti-social
individual action."
The poll results suggest public opinion favors greater accounta-
bility for intoxicated offenders; the contrast between legislative and
judicial action on the subject proves as much. Legislative enactments
uniformly increase the responsibility of inebriates; only courts mini-
mize the accountability of the severely intoxicated. 22 5 One may infer
that Americans value the right to consume intoxicating substances
and be protected from the legal consequences of their conduct less
than they value the right to walk in their neighborhoods, protected
from the physical consequences of another's intemperance.
concurring).
220 Hall, supra note 48, at 1061.
221 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAw & CoNrrEMp.
PROBS., 47, 77 n.84 (1986) (citing H.LA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 46-47, 181-
82 (1968)).
222 Id.
223 SOURCEBOOK-1994, supra note 197, at 144 tbl. 2.7.
224 Id.
225 See infra Appendix.
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A democracy respects its citizens' choices about how to maximize
their welfare. Increasing the criminal responsibility of intoxicated of-
fenders involves tradeoffs; the policy reallocates burdens and benefits
within a society. No court should usurp authority for such a decision
from the people who must live with its consequences.2 26
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the nineteenth century, Americans had a right to drink alco-
hol, tempered by the responsibility to avoid an extreme level of intoxi-
cation which would endanger others. This balance properly
recognized the risk of harm intoxication presents, and the rule allo-
cated the burden of that risk to those who chose to create it.
By the twentieth century, the right to drink had become a right to
become stuporous and received partial (or complete) immunity for
the consequences of one's acts. 227 This shift was due to a convergence
of several new philosophies. New political values asserted that society,
not the individual, has the duty to prevent harm. New medical values
considered intoxication and its consequences to be beyond the indi-
vidual's power to control. New criminological values stressed rehabili-
tation of the offender instead of protection of the potential victim.
Finally, new cultural values exalted the immediate physical gratifica-
tion available through intoxication over the long-term and less tangi-
ble benefit of a safer community. These new philosophies shaped the
law in a new cultural environment in which the former value of self-
control was displaced by the goal of individual self-expression.
Unfortunately, this shift coincided with an outburst of crime. 228
Expanding rights for one class of people, without tying these rights to
reciprocal duties, by definition contracts the rights of everyone else.
Laws that make offenders less vulnerable to punishment have ren-
dered all other citizens more vulnerable to criminal violence. By legis-
lating for the "private good" rather than the "common good,"22 9 states
allowing a defense of voluntary intoxication may have undermined
226 Cf. Ronald C. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendmen 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 359-62 (1994).
227 This right to drink was of course nonexistent from 1919-1933. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIJI, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. However, there appears to be a correlation
between the diminished responsibility demanded of drinkers and drug users and their
diminished right to enjoy such substances. See supra notes 46-47. As the California
Supreme Court has observed, "Freedom and responsibility are joined at the hip." People
ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
228 FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 441.
229 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DeRegiminePincum in ON POLICS AND ETHics, 14, 15 (Paul
E. Sigmund ed. and trans., 1988).
516 [Vol. 87
INTOXICATION DEFENSE
both.230 The security and protection of the community is the bedrock
on which the superstructure of individual liberty rests.23' An individ-
ual's rights cannot be safe if she is not.
In 1969, the California Supreme Court declared that the intoxica-
tion defense was a "compromise between the conflicting feelings of
sympathy and reprobation for the intoxicated offender."23 2 Increas-
ingly, states are realizing that the law's sympathy, and its protection,
belong not with an individual who consumes a stupefying amount of
intoxicants and shoots two innocent people in the head, but with the
victims of such slaughter. With more than 10,000 people dying each
year at the hands of intoxicated killers, it is no time for compromise.
230 Inebriates themselves are likely even more vulnerable than sober citizens to crime.
231 Gabo, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
























The following states follow the Model Penal Code and admit intoxica-
tion evidence as a defense only to crimes requiring purpose or
knowledge.
Alabama247
233 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
234 See White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784, 787-88 (Ark. 1986).
235 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995); Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649, 654 (Del.
1986).
236 See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-704(c) (1988).
237 See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-230(1) (Michie 1993); State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384,
1386 (Haw. 1991).
288 See McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially con-
curring).
239 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996); State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d
476, 482 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
240 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).
241 See State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977).
242 See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (West 1977).
243 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1994).
244 See Chittum v. Commonwealth, 174 S.E.2d 779, 783 (Va. 1970).
245 See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(2) (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1995).
246 See People v. Zekany, 833 P.2d 774, 778 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
247 SeeALA. CODE § 13A-3-2(b) (1994).
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The following states admit intoxication as a defense only to crimes











248 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 1994).
249 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 501.020(3) (Michie 1990). Kentucky's term for the mental
state described by the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness is "wanton[ness]." Id.
§ 501.020(3). Kentucky defines recklessness with the Model Penal Code definition of neg-
ligence. Id. § 501.020(4).
250 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 37(2) (West 1994).
251 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2-11(c) (1996).
252 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8(b) (West 1995).
253 See N.Y. PFAL LAW § 15.05[3] (McKinney 1987).
254 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02 (1985).
255 See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.125(2) (1995).
256 See TEiNN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-503(b) (1991).
257 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1995).
258 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 989.24(3) (West 1996).
259 See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377-78 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
260 See Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985).
261 See State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 619-20 (Idaho 1991).
262 See People v. Mocaby, 551 N.E.2d. 678, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
263 See State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986).
264 See State v. McDaniel, 612 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Kan. 1980).
265 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:15(2) (West 1986).
266 See Hook v. State, 553 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Md. 1989).
267 See Commonwealth v. Troy, 540 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Mass. 1989).













The following states admit intoxication as a defense to all crimes re-
quiring purpose, knowledge or recklessness.
Ohio2 8 0
Washington281
The following state admits intoxication evidence as a defense to any
crime.
Indiana282
269 See State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 1979).
270 See State v. Lesiak, 449 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Neb. 1989).
271 See Nevius v. State, 699 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Nev. 1985).
272 See State v. Tapia, 466 P.2d 551, 553 (N.M. 1970).
273 See State v. White, 229 S.E.2d 152, 157 (N.C. 1976).
274 See Boyd v. State, 572 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
275 See State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993).
276 See State v. Primeaux, 328 N.W.2d 256, 259 (S.D. 1982).
277 See State v. D'Amico, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (Vt. 1978).
278 See State v. Keeton, 272 S.E.2d 817, 820 (W. Va. 1980).
279 See Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 51 (Wyo. 1986).
280 See State v. Gates, 462 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
281 See State v. Collins, 632 P.2d 68, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
282 See Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984).
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